

Confessionalism as a Political System in Lebanon: Any Relevance for Nigeria?

Adeyanju, Faith Omolola

Abstract

This study compares the power-sharing model in Nigeria with the confessional political system of Lebanon, with a primary focus on the possible relevance of confessionalism in Nigeria. With the use of extant literature and Lijphart's theory of consociationalism, this paper examines the applicability of confessionalism in Nigeria. It also assesses whether comparable power-sharing arrangements could effectively manage the intricacies of Nigeria's heterogeneous population and promote political stability while mitigating sectarian strife. The paper concludes that Nigeria's efforts to achieve national unity may be hampered by the adoption of confessionalism. Nigeria's diversity is its greatest asset, but a confessional system poses the risk of prioritizing religious distinctions over national identity. Thus, Nigeria should respect constitutional secularism and give priority to inclusive governance methods.

Keywords: confessional system, federalism, inclusivity, power-sharing model

Introduction

Confessionalism is a distinct political system that is ingrained in Lebanon's history and political landscape (Vaughan, 2018). This political system is characterized by the division of power among religious factions and has been adopted to reflect the diversity of the Lebanese people (El Sayed, 2022; Badran, 2020). Thus, different religious communities, such as Sunni and Shia Muslims, Druze, Maronite Christians, and others, have designated roles and quotas under this system (Salamey, 2009). This particular configuration resulted from Lebanon's demographics, which are smaller but diversified, with a fairly even distribution across religious communities (Nakouzi et al., 2014). Confessionalism was adopted to prevent one dominant sect from having absolute power, to enhance stability and representation by bringing opposing religious factions together in the government process. However, this structure has also led to political unrest and recurring disputes, illustrating the difficulties that come with power-sharing agreements based on religious affinities (Calfat, 2018). The federal character principle in Nigeria's Constitution is a framework which promotes equality and inclusivity among the country's numerous ethnic, religious, and regional groups.

Adeyanju, Faith Omolola Department of Political Science and Public Administration Babcock University, Ogun State, Nigeria adeyanju0182@pg.babcock.edu.ng

Unlike Lebanon, which explicitly distributes political power according to religious affiliation, Nigeria's federal character concept aims to prevent domination by any one group by ensuring an equitable distribution of government jobs and resources throughout the federation. This concept was put into practice to ease ethnic tensions and foster national unity in a society that is severely divided along religious and regional lines. (Suberu, 2022; Idike et al., 2019). Although the Nigerian federal character concept and Lebanon's confessionalism both aim to minimize marginalization and foster inclusivity, they diverge in that the federal character places more emphasis on regional balance and ethnicity than on religious differences. Power-sharing is the goal of both systems, but Nigeria's federal character principle has generated discussions over its effectiveness. Critics contend that it frequently undermines meritocracy and promotes political patronage (Demarest et al., 2020). The study adopts Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism, which stresses power-sharing systems in divided societies. Lebanon's confessionalism can be viewed through Lijphart's framework as an institutionalized power-sharing mechanism that seeks to balance religion representation through proportionality and elite collaboration (Lijphart, 2008).

Therefore, this paper aims to comparatively analyze the historical experiences of Lebanon and the socio-political environment of Nigeria. Nigeria's federal character principle and Lebanon's confessionalism have each been examined separately as mechanisms for power sharing in multiple societies, little comparative study has been done to see how Nigeria may benefit from Lebanon's confessionalism. This study aims to close this gap by investigating if Nigeria's continuous battles with the federal character principle in striking a balance between inclusion and national unity could be influenced by Lebanon's confessional system. A significant gap in the literature on power-sharing models in post-colonial, multiethnic communities is also filled by the study's evaluation of potential opportunities and risks of implementing a confessional-like framework in Nigeria. This study will also examine the usefulness of power-sharing models in pluralistic countries and recommend substitute frameworks to improve national unity in Nigeria.

Historical Context of Confessionalism in Lebanon

The demographic distribution of Lebanon's religious groupings is one of the most significant aspects of its identity and political system. Historically, this distribution has been reasonably balanced, with small communities like the Druze holding significant minority status and about one-third of the population identifying as Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim (Mallo, 2019; Faour, 2007). This balanced yet diversified composition enabled Lebanon's unique experiment with confessional power-sharing, which seeks to guarantee representation and political stability by dividing governmental authority among religious factions. The Taif Agreement of 1989 further reinforced this structure by instituting sectarian quotas for key positions in the government (Bahout, 2016). Also, the National Pact of 1943 formalized Lebanon's confessional system, which was based on its historical, social, and political context. It aimed to preserve a precarious balance between religious groups by allocating important government positions, such as the speaker of parliament for Shia Muslims, the prime minister for Sunni Muslims, and the presidency for Maronite Christians (Ghosn & Khoury, 2011). The purpose of this system was to promote inclusivity and avoid the dominance of any one sect. However, sectarian strife have threatened the system's viability (Diss & Steffen, 2017; Bahout, 2016). The system's inherent rigidity has resulted in political inefficiency and stagnation. National cohesion has declined and entrenched

corruption has resulted from Lebanon's government's incapacity to adapt to changing socioeconomic and demographic conditions (Mubarak, 2009; Harb, 2006). By distributing power among religious groups, the Taif Agreement of 1989 sought to alter the constitutional framework, but it has not fully resolved the underlying issues. Sectarian divisions are made worse by the allocation of government positions based on religious identity, and the confessional system continues to obstruct social progress and fuel political unrest in Lebanon (Herrfahrdt-Pähle et al., 2020; Craig et al., 2017).

The political landscape has been further complicated by Lebanon's history of civil war (1975–1990) as well as external interventions, which connect historical sociopolitical conflicts to the present challenges of sectarian government (Huerta, 2022; Spaans & Touber, 2019). Although the system was created to control religious diversity, it has been criticized for escalating sectarianism, impeding efficient government, and the formation of a unified national identity (Mudawar, 2017; Cox et al., 2014). Other nations, like Nigeria, that have comparable challenges to governing religious variety and diversity might learn a lot from Lebanon's struggles to reform its confessional system. Lebanon's confessional system has had a number of challenges over the years, particularly in adapting to the country's current sociopolitical environment. The rigid division of political roles based on religious affiliation has reinforced the prioritization of sect interests over national unity (Bahout, 2016) which has led to corruption and inefficiencies in governance. It has also become increasingly difficult to maintain the delicate balance that the confessional system depends on as Lebanon's population develops because different religious groups have different birth rates and emigration trends (Herrfahrdt-Pähle et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the nation's history has been shaped by wars that continue to reverberate through the complex web of governance and social structure. The confessional system in Lebanon has an intricate link with a history of conflicts that have heightened sectarian tensions and prolonged periods of political instability, most notably the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990 (Hourani, 2021). Rooted in long-standing socio-political and sectarian grievances, the civil war was a complex battle. Crucial political positions were distributed according to sectarian quotas because of the confessional system that was instituted by the National Pact of 1943. But instead of promoting harmony, this system concentrated political power along religious lines, intensifying rivalry for political dominance and strengthening sectarian identities. As a result, rival sectarian interests battling for control of politics turned Lebanon into a battlefield. Tensions increased when authority passed between religious factions, further entrenching sectarian divisions. There have been deadly clashes between the Maronite Christian population, who typically wield major governmental influence, and other religious sects, especially Sunni and Shia Muslims (refworld, 2023).

Also, Lebanon's geographic location and involvement in regional conflicts have further exacerbated internal divisions. Foreign interventions and proxy wars have regularly taken advantage of Lebanon's sectarian tensions, further distorting the political landscape and jeopardizing the nation's stability (Huerta, 2022). Therefore, the confessional system, which was formerly believed to be a solution to the nation's religious variety, is the cause of Lebanon's political paralysis and continuous instability (Mubarak, 2009).

Additionally, the rigidity of the confessional system has resulted in persistent political impasse. The fact that political leaders frequently put the interests of their sect before the benefit of the nation due to the confessional system's perpetuation of a culture of patronage and clientelism has increased economic inequality, corruption, and a lack of accountability.

(Cortés & Kairouz, 2023; Usenata, 2022). Inaction and gridlock are frequently the outcome of sectarian factions' need for agreement to pass important laws or make important decisions, which causes political stagnation. Sectarian conflicts show up in politics, but they also affect how people interact with one another and perceive the world. From social relationships, to work and education, these conflicts are present in many facets of day-to-day living. Differences in opportunity stemming from religious affiliations reinforce sectarian identities and create segregated societies.

The people's dissatisfaction with the political system led by sectarianism was brought to light by the 2019 protests in Lebanon. This was sparked by the country's economic woes and general disenchantment with the political class. Protesters called for an end to the nation's urgent problems, including corruption and sectarianism, as well as a revision of the confessional system. (Abiyaghi & Yammine, 2013)

The experience of Lebanon emphasizes how important it is to move beyond sectarian politics to achieve long-term stability. A zero-sum game in which political gains for one sect frequently translate into losses for another has been sustained by an over-reliance on the confessional system (Preston, 2013). It is imperative to surpass this framework to cultivate a governance system that is more inclusive and coherent.

Inclusive governance frameworks that value meritocracy above sectarian quotas are necessary. The implementation of a governance model that prioritizes inclusivity and competency, regardless of religious affiliation, may help to alleviate sectarian impasse and cultivate a more responsive and functional government.

Consideration of Alternative Model for Power-Sharing and Governance

Confessionalism is uncommon in modern governance structures worldwide as it easily fuels sectarian strife. Often, inclusive approaches that place a greater emphasis on citizenship than religious identification are given priority in nations with a diverse religious population (Abu-Hamad, 1995). Its unusual status stems mainly from the difficulties and constraints it presents when used, as it does in Lebanon. The majority of countries choose secular or non-religious types of government to promote inclusive communities and overcome religious differences in their political systems. The rarity of confessional systems is evidence of the widespread conviction that religion and state should be kept apart in many nations, highlighting the significance of institutions that speak for all citizens, regardless of their religious views. This peculiarity highlights a global trend toward governing frameworks that emphasize inclusivity and secular values to lessen the risks and divisions that confessional systems may bring. An increasing number of countries that deal with religious or ethnic diversity have looked into non-confessional methods of power-sharing and governance that emphasize inclusivity (Sisk, 2016; Reslan, 2022). Among the various models that have demonstrated promise in allowing variety while preserving political stability are federalism, decentralization, and consociationalism democracy.

Federalism: States or regions are granted some degree of autonomy in government when federal arrangements are adopted by nations such as the United States, Germany, Switzerland, India, and Austria (Rozell & Wilcox, 2019). While preserving a cohesive national identity, federal systems allow local self-governance. Instead, of depending only on sectarian boundaries, this paradigm guarantees participation and representation.

Consociationalism Democracy: a form of democracy practiced in Belgium and the Netherlands, prioritizes power-sharing amongst various social groupings (Andeweg, 2015). Without strictly defining political responsibilities based on religious or ethnic affinities, it

entails established procedures for many groups to have a say in decision-making, encouraging consensus-building and cooperation.

Decentralization: Renowned nations like Brazil and Spain have embraced decentralization to give local people more say over decisions (Willis et al., 1999). By giving communities or regions the authority to handle their particular requirements and still contribute to the greater national goal, this model empowers them.

Comparative studies conducted across borders underscore the shortcomings of confessional systems and the practicality of alternative models of governance that place a higher priority on inclusivity, consensus-building, and decentralized decision-making (Dagher, 2022). Through investigating various strategies to accept religious and ethnic differences, countries can manage difficulties while cultivating cohesion and stability beyond sectarian lines.

Having explored Lebanon's confessional system, it is expedient to now examine its potential relevance and applicability in Nigeria's political context.

Relevance of Confessionalism in the Nigerian Context

Nigeria Federal Character

Enshrined in Nigeria's constitution, the Federal Character Principle serves as a framework for promoting inclusivity and equal representation among the nation's different ethnic, regional, and religious populations (Suberu, 2022; Idike et al., 2019). This principle prohibits the domination of any one group by requiring that positions and resources held by the government represent the variety of the nation. The study frames Nigeria's federal character principle as a "quasi-confessional" model. Nigeria's system encourages inclusivity through organized power-sharing among ethnic and regional groupings, reflecting elements of confessionalism even if it does not specifically assign political posts based on religious affiliation. This research contributes to larger discussions on diversity management, especially in post-colonial nations that are grappling with religious and ethnic plurality. Nigeria and other post-colonial states frequently struggle to maintain national cohesion while guaranteeing representation for underrepresented groups (Igwe, 2024; Obikaeze et al., 2023). Lijphart's (2008) consociational model, which stresses power-sharing in multiple societies, provides important context for understanding how Lebanon's confessionalism aims to strike a balance between religious representation. According to his framework, elite cooperation and proportionality—two characteristics of Lebanon's political system—are essential for stable democracies in sharply divided countries.

The Federal Character Principle is a topic of controversy regarding its efficiency, much like confessionalism, which has been criticized for deepening divisions in society. Otu et al. (2024) analyzed the federal character principle's effect on hiring and advancement at the University of Abuja Teaching Hospital and found that while it encourages diversity, it often undermines meritocracy, leading to inefficiency and dissatisfaction within the organization. Their findings illustrate the challenge of balancing diversity and competency in public institutions under this framework.

Similarly, Onyebuchi, et al. (2024) studied the political exclusion of Southeast Nigeria between 2015 and 2019. They opined that the federal character principle has sometimes exacerbated regional inequality and political marginalization. To promote national unity, their study emphasizes the necessity of more equitable representation of all region, especially in political appointments. Likewise, Okwara et al. (2023) conducted an evaluation of the principle's effectiveness in public service in Enugu, Kogi State, and the Federal

Capital Territory which yielded mixed findings. While the concept promotes diversity, it often leads to inefficiencies because it prioritizes group identification over quality. Additionally, Benson and Audu (2021) draw attention to the principle's limited effect on national integration in federal tertiary institutions, where it occasionally exacerbates regional conflicts and resentment. Although the federal character principle seeks to promote unity, these studies indicate that it frequently has unintended repercussions that threaten meritocracy and governance.

Critics have pointed out that the Federal Character Principle doesn't always work as intended. Even though its goal is inclusivity, others claim that it may encourage mediocrity rather than meritocracy, which would affect how effective political institutions are (Demarest et al., 2020; Wisdom, 2018). Other debates also rage on whether it is a symbolic gesture that has little bearing on equity and representation or if it tackles the root causes of marginalization. Nigeria's Federal Character Principle resembles some of the inclusion and power-sharing seen in Lebanon's confessional system (Abou, 2022; Agarin, 2019) even though it does not quite replicate revelationism. Both aim to prevent the marginalization of particular communities and address representational issues. Ongoing discussions continue, meanwhile, over how well they work to maintain merit-based governance and promote true inclusivity and national unity.

Furthermore, occasional occurrences of Muslim-Muslim or Muslim-Christian tickets in Nigerian politics have given rise to discussions about religious representation in the executive branch. Similar to confessional arrangements in Lebanon, these ticket formations entail political alliances or partnerships involving candidates from different religious origins seeking to compete for important governmental positions. Even though they are uncommon, Muslim-Muslim tickets have sparked conversations about diversity, representation, and possible effects on national cohesion (cswpress, 2023; Okojie, 2022). They highlight the difficulties in striking a balance between religious variety and political representation, reflecting the confessional distribution of roles along religious lines in Lebanon.

Also, when Muslim and Christian candidates create political alliances, arguments and disputes result. These alliances show efforts to promote inclusivity and heal religious rifts. But they also raise issues of representation, power dynamics, and whether these kinds of alliances can successfully address the grievances of various religious groups in Nigeria's sociopolitical context. These incidents highlight the challenges of inclusivity, representation, and striking a balance between religious connections and government without reproducing the strict structures of confessionalism, and they also show Nigeria's attempts to manage religious diversity within its political arena.

Critical Analysis of Confessionalism's Feasibility in Nigeria

Nigeria would find it challenging to implement Lebanon's confessionalism, despite the fact that it offers a unique form of power-sharing. This system may not be feasible due to Nigeria's complex religious and ethnic composition. Confessionalism has the potential of institutionalizing religious differences in Nigeria, further dividing the country's Muslim and Christian communities, especially when political rivalry is involved. Confessionalism frequently puts religious ties ahead of national identity, as is the case in Lebanon, which results in political impasses and ineffective government (Accad & Hani, 2021; Salamey, 2009). By fostering clientelism and patronage, such a system in Nigeria would jeopardize the efficacy of governance and weaken merit-based appointments (Demarest et al., 2021).

Adopting a similar system in Nigeria could further alienate minority religious and ethnic groups, adding to resentment and instability; the focus on religious quotas may overshadow the larger goal of nation-building and inclusivity, creating a fragmented political terrain; and in Lebanon, the system has resulted in entrenched sectarian identities, impeding the development of a cohesive national identity (Stewart, 2012).

However, Nigerian confessionalists would argue that, in light of the country's diverse ethnic and religious composition, which is similar to that of Lebanon, explicit power-sharing processes would be beneficial. They contend that such a system may enable marginalized people to participate in politics by addressing grievances and preventing crises like the Biafran independence movement (Onyebuchi, et al., 2024). Some may also propose changing Nigeria's federal character principle to include more official religious representation to ease religious tensions in the country and foster more stability (Otu, et al., 2024).

It is important to critically examine confessionalism's potential to weaken national unity. In Nigeria's case, widening religious divides through confessionalism could exacerbate already-existing conflicts and reduce the effectiveness of governance. The population of Nigeria is more varied and fragmented than that of Lebanon due to the overlap of ethnic, regional, and religious identities. Having a rigid confessional system can cause divisions rather than bring people together.

Consequently, Nigeria should prioritize inclusive government models that transcend religious divides to ensure fair representation and foster a sense of national cohesion. Despite its shortcomings, Nigeria's federal character principle is nevertheless better than confessionalism because it promotes diversity without explicitly defining religious differences (Idike et al., 2019). Despite its constitutional secularism, Nigeria's socio-political environment often demonstrates traits that are similar to aspects of confessionalism, albeit in a different setting. Although Nigeria's governance is not as overtly religiously oriented as Lebanon's confessional system, there are religious and political analogies between the two systems that are discussed. In Nigeria, the entwinement of religion and politics occasionally affects political alliances and power structures (Echele, 2023). Nigerian political alliances often form along religious lines or use religious ties as a means of support, much as confessionalism's religious-based political roles (Umeanolue, 2020). These alignments occasionally resemble the dynamics observed in the confessional arrangements in Lebanon, prompting questions about whether Nigeria is essentially exhibiting parts of confessionalism under a covert cloak.

Similar to the differences observed in confessional systems, discussions center on whether voters' actions are slightly influenced by their religious identity or whether religious concerns have a subtle influence on political decisions. The degree to which Nigeria, despite its constitutional secularism, struggles with confessional-like features within its political landscape is called into question by the existence of religious sentiment in political discourse and the possible impact on governance dynamics. Though different from Lebanon's overt confessionalism, these discussions highlight the challenges of maintaining a secular governing system while balancing religious influences, and they also allude to subtle parallels in the relationship between politics and religion. While Lebanon's model may offer insights, Nigeria's distinct religious and ethnic dynamic present unique challenges.

Considering Nigeria's distinct socio-political environment and taking lessons from Lebanon's experiences, adopting confessionalism will pose certain challenges. This system

of government could worsen already-existing sectarian divides in Nigeria or cause new ones. Christians and Muslims make up the majority of Nigeria's diverse religious population, and tensions already arise from time to time (Umeanwe, 2021; Fox, 2021; Tuduks, 2021). Confessional systems can exacerbate social divisions by amplifying religious identities in politics. This could intensify religiously motivated rivalry for political dominance, escalating tensions and eroding societal cohesiveness. Confessionalism has the potential to escalate inter religious tensions in Nigeria, which have historically resulted in instability and strife.

Furthermore, Nigeria's efforts to achieve national unity may be hampered by the adoption of confessionalism. Nigeria's diversity is its greatest asset, but a confessional system runs the risk of prioritizing religious distinctions over national identity. This might make it more difficult to promote national unity and even split the nation along religious lines. The prioritization of religious identities may be strengthened by the emphasis on religious quotas in administration, which would diminish attempts to promote unity and the larger Nigerian identity. Nigeria ought to draw a lot of lessons from Lebanon's confessionalism problems. The dangers of confessional arrangements are brought to light by Lebanon's history of sectarian violence and difficulties in creating a cohesive national identity.

Therefore, confessionalism may appear like a solution to Nigeria's diversity issues, but the risks of replicating Lebanon's issues much outweigh any potential benefits. Nigeria's federal character principle, in spite of its shortcomings, offers a more adaptable framework for achieving a balance between inclusion and meritocracy. If changes are made to improve its efficacy, it remains a superior choice over confessionalism for promoting political stability and national cohesion.

Recommendations for Nigeria

Nigeria should emphasize the value of inclusive governance models that cut across religious boundaries by taking a cue from Lebanon's experiences. By addressing local needs and encouraging a sense of ownership in governance, a stronger devolution of powers would give regions greater autonomy. The Federal Character Principle of Nigeria must be better applied. Confessionalism can be avoided while promoting inclusion by strictly adhering to this principle, which emphasizes merit-based appointments and fair representation among many ethnic and regional groups.

Policies that encourage inclusivity and place a higher priority on citizenship rather than on racial or religious affinities must be given top priority in Nigeria. One can develop a sense of national identity by promoting discourse, civic education, and cultural exchange programs, which can heal divisions and promote unanimity in the face of contrast. Beyond religious or ethnic divides, national cohesiveness can also be strengthened by policies that promote socioeconomic development and equitable opportunity for all.

Conclusion

This paper sheds light on the nuances of confessionalism in Lebanon and its somewhat relevant application to Nigeria's geopolitical context. Nigeria's Federal Character Principle is similar to confessionalism in its aim for inclusivity. However, adopting confessionalism in Nigeria has drawbacks, such as weakening national cohesiveness. Nigeria's heterogeneous religious population makes it unlikely that confessionalism can be directly

replicated there. Rather than expressly dividing the government along religious lines, Nigeria might learn from Lebanon's struggles to promote inclusivity. Nigeria should proceed cautiously when implementing government models that could highlight religious divides, emphasizing the need for national unity over sectarian tensions. To prevent sectarian conflict and improve national unity, Lebanon must modernize its confessional system. Nigeria, on the other hand, ought to respect constitutional secularism and give priority to inclusive governance methods. Both countries stand to gain from forging ahead with inclusive systems that put meritocracy and national cohesion above divisive government structures.

References

- Abiyaghi, M.N., & Yammine, L. (2013). The October 2019 protests in Lebanon: Between contention and reproduction. *Civil Society Knowledge Centre*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.28943/cskc.001.80000>
- Abou J.T. (2022). The grey areas of political illegitimacy. *Third World Quarterly*, 43(10), 2413–2429. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2094235>
- Abu-Hamad, A. (1995). Communal Strife in Lebanon: Ancient Animosity or State Intervention? *Journal of International Affairs*, 49(1), 231–254. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357450>
- Accad, M., & Hani, C. (2021). Christian-Muslim Relations in the midst of Pandemic: A Case Study from Lebanon. *The Muslim World*, 111(4), 601–615. <https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12415>
- Agarin, T. (2019). The limits of inclusion: Representation of minority and non-dominant communities in consociational and liberal democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 41(1), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119881801>
- Andeweg, R. B. (2015). Consociationalism. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 692–694. <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.93025-3>
- Badran, S. (2020). The dissolution of the Lebanese parliament: A perverted application of the parliamentary system. *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 29(2), 200–214. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12217>
- Bahout, J. (2016, May 16). *The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571>
- Benson, L., & Audu, Y. M. (2021). The impact of federal character principles on national integration in the selected federal tertiary institutions in Nigeria. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, 05(01), 214–220. <https://doi.org/10.47772/ijriss.2021.5109>
- Calfat, N. N. (2018). The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Confessional Framework. *Contexto Internacional*, 40(2), 269–293. <https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2018400200002>
- Center for Preventive Action. (2022, May 12). *Political Instability in Lebanon*. Global Conflict Tracker. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-lebanon>
- Cox, F., Orsborn, C., & Sisk, T. (2014). *Religion, Peacebuilding, and Social Cohesion in Conflict-affected Countries Research Report*. Retrieved December 22, 2023, from https://www.socialcohesion.info/fileadmin/user_upload/Library/PDF/Religion_and

- Social Cohesion - Research Report 2014.pdf.
- Craig, R. K., Garmestani, A. S., Allen, C. R., Arnold, C. A. (Tony), Birgé, H., DeCaro, D. A., Fremier, A. K., Gosnell, H., & Schlager, E. (2017). Balancing stability and flexibility in adaptive governance: an analysis of tools available in U.S. environmental law. *Ecology and Society*, 22(2). <https://doi.org/10.5751/es-08983-220203>
- cswpress. (2023, January 30). *Nigeria's Muslim-Muslim ticket has implications for national cohesion*. FoRB in Full. <https://forbinfull.org/2023/01/30/nigerias-muslim-muslim-ticket-has-implications-for-national-cohesion/>
- Tuduks, O. (2021). empirical interrogation of the Christian/Muslim inter-religious challenges in Northern Nigeria. *STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal*, 6(4). <https://doi.org/10.17570/stj.2020.v6n4.a16>
- Dagher, G. (2022, August 16). *The Policy Initiative - The Lebanese electoral system: Shortcomings and reform*. The Policy Initiative. <https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/191/the-lebanese-electoral-system-shortcomings-and-reform>
- Demarest, L. (2021). Elite clientelism in Nigeria: The role of parties in weakening legislator-voter ties. *Party Politics*, 135406882110302. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211030219>.
- Demarest, L., Langer, A., & Ukiwo, U. (2020). Nigeria's Federal Character Commission (FCC): a critical appraisal. *Oxford Development Studies*, 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2020.1727427>.
- Diss, M., & Steffen, F. (2017). *The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited*. Shs.hal.science. <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01587503>.
- Echele, K. (2023). *Weaponization of Religion: The Manipulation of Religion in the Weaponization of Religion: The Manipulation of Religion in the Pursuit of Political Power in Yugoslavia and Syria Pursuit of Political Power in Yugoslavia and Syria*. https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=international_senior
- El Sayed, M. (2022). Lebanese Sunni Muslim Politicians' Narratives on the Political and Religious Leadership of the Lebanese Sunnis: Reconstructing Inclusive Political Leadership in Lebanon. *International Journal of Social Science Research and Review*, 5(9), 383–400. <https://doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v5i9.625>
- Faour, M. A. (2007). Religion, demography, and politics in Lebanon. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(6), 909–921. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200701568279>
- Fox, G. (2021, March 5). *Religious Conflict in Nigeria: How it has Become a Threat to National Security and what can be Done to Stop it*. Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust. <https://www.hart-uk.org/blog/religious-conflict-in-nigeria-how-it-has-become-a-threat-to-national-security-and-what-can-be-done-to-stop-it/>
- Ghosn, F., & Khoury, A. (2011). Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the Illusion of Peace? *Middle East Journal*, 65(3), 381–397. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23012171>
- Harb, I. (2006, March 30). *Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/03/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects>
- Herrfahrdt-Pähle, E., Schlüter, M., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Gelcich, S., & Pahl-Wostl, C. (2020). Sustainability transformations: socio-political shocks as opportunities for governance transitions. *Global Environmental Change*, 63, 102097. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102097>
- Hourani, N. (2021, October 6). *Capturing the Complexity of Lebanon's Civil War and Its Legacies*. MERIP. <https://merip.org/2021/10/capturing-the-complexity-of-lebanons->

- civil-war-and-its-legacies/
- Huerta, S. E. S. (2022). The Lebanese National Pact, a political mosaic with the missing glue of a cohesive national identity. *Wwww.academia.edu*. https://www.academia.edu/103453705/The_Lebanese_National_Pact_a_political_mosaic_with_the_missing_glue_of_a_cohesive_national_identity
- Idike, A., Ukeje, I. O., Iwuala, H. O., Onele, J. C., Ekwunife, R. A., Nwachukwu, K., & Udu, O. (2019). The practice of inclusive representation in Nigeria bureaucracy: The federal character principle experience. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 5(1), 1601545. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2019.1601545>
- Igwe, P. A. (2024). Nigerian identity crisis: what's behind the growing insecurity and separatism? *African Identities*, 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2023.2299367>
- Lijphart, A. (2008). *Thinking about Democracy*. Routledge.
- Mallo, A. (2019). Development of Violence and Sectarianism in Lebanon. *Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects*. https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors_research_projects/936
- Mbuba, F. (2021, April 27). *Federal Character Principle and Nigerian Federalism: An Overview*. Ssrn.com. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835070
- Mubarak, A. (2009). *Religion and Politics: Integration, Separation and Conflict - Irénées*. Wwww.irenees.net. https://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-884_en.html
- Mudawar, J. M. (2017). Understanding the impact of ethnic divisions on political stability in Lebanon. *Wwww.academia.edu*. https://www.academia.edu/37508923/Understanding_the_impact_of_ethnic_divisions_on_political_stability_in_Lebanon
- Nakouzi, G., Kreidieh, K., & Yazbek, S. (2014). A review of the diverse genetic disorders in the Lebanese population: highlighting the urgency for community genetic services. *Journal of Community Genetics*, 6(1), 83–105. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12687-014-0203-3>
- Obikaeze, V. C., Udoh, O. N., Adebogun, O. B., & Enapeh, O. D. (2023). The State and Dilemma of Post-Colonial Nigeria: An Explanatory Perspective of Security Governance Failure. *ABUAD Journal of Social and Management Sciences*, 4(1), 38–55. <https://doi.org/10.53982/ajsms.2023.0401.03-j>
- Okeke, C. E. (2019). Implementation and enforcement of the federal character principle in Nigeria. *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence*, 10(2), 174–185. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/nauijl/article/view/183698>
- Okojie, G. (2022, July 18). *Muslim-Muslim Ticket: Nation-building Beyond Religious Sentiments – Bakare*. <https://leadership.ng/muslim-muslim-ticket-nation-building-beyond-religious-sentiments-bakare/>
- Okwara, E. C., Jooji, I., & Momoh, Z. (2023). The Effectiveness of the Federal Character Principle in Enugu, Kogi State and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Public Service. *International Journal of Professional Business Review*, 8(9), e03360–e03360. <https://doi.org/10.26668/businessreview/2023.v8i9.3360>
- Onyebuchi E. E., Ekene Okoye, K., & Terkimbi Akov, E. (2024). The Federal Character Principle and Political Exclusion of Southeast Nigeria, 2015–2019. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 32(2), 651–674. <https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.32.2.14>
- Otu, J. A., Okafor, I. J., & Lawal, Y. (2024). Assessing the Impact of Federal Character Principle on Recruitment and Promotion in the University of Abuja Teaching Hospital, FCT, Nigeria. *Deleted Journal*, 17(1), 18–43. <https://doi.org/10.62154/ajmbr.2024.017.010452>

- Preston, S. (2013). *The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics: Lessons from Lebanon and the Future of Iraq*. ScholarWorks at WMU. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses/2281
- Refworld (2023, December 27). *Chronology for Maronite Christians in Lebanon*. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38b3c.html>
- Reslan, F. B. (2022). Understanding the impact of confessional diversity in the Lebanese public sector. Case study: The Lebanese Ministry of Finance. *Current Psychology*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-022-02823-7>
- Rozell, M. J., & Wilcox, C. (2019). 7. Federalism in the world. *Oxford University Press EBooks*, 88–116. <https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190900052.003.0007>
- Sisk, T. D. (2016, July 13). *Power Sharing*. Beyond Intractability. https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power_sharing
- Spaans, J., & Touber, J. (2019). Enlightened Religion: From Confessional Churches to Polite Piety in the Dutch Republic. *BRILL EBooks*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004389397_002
- Stewart, H. (2012). Lebanon's national identity: Walking between raindrops? *The Levantine Review*, 1(2), 153. <https://doi.org/10.6017/lev.v1i2.3048>
- Suberu, R. T. (2022). Ethnic inequality, the federal character principle, and the reform of Nigeria's presidential federalism. *WIDER Working Paper*. <https://doi.org/10.35188/unu-wider/2022/247-8>
- Umeanolue, I. L. (2020). Religious influences on politics in Nigeria: Implications for national development. *OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies*, 15(1), 139–157. <https://doi.org/10.4314/og.v15i1.9s>
- Umeanwe, C. M. (2021). Religious crisis and management in Nigeria. *Journal of African Studies and Sustainable Development*. <https://acjol.org/index.php/jassd/article/view/1719>
- Usenata, N. (2022, June 27). *Does corruption cause income inequality and long-run poverty?(Evidence from Nigeria)*. Mpra.ub.uni-Muenchen.de. <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113588/>
- Vaughan, K. (2018). Who Benefits from Consociationalism? Religious Disparities in Lebanon's Political System. *Religions*, 9(2), 51. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9020051>
- Willis, E., Garman, C. da C. B., & Haggard, S. (1999). The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 34(1), 7–56. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2503925>
- Wisdom, O. (2018). Federal character principle its applicability and challenges in Nigeria. *Federal Character Principle Its Applicability and Challenges in Nigeria*. https://www.academia.edu/38601946/Federal_character_principle_its_applicability_and_challenges_in_Nigeria